Market conditions, default risk and credit spreads

This study empirically examine the impact of market conditions on credit spreads as motivated by recently developed structural credit risk models. Using credit default swap (CDS) spreads, we find that, in the time series, average credit spreads are decreasing in GDP growth rate, but increasing in GDP growth volatility. We document that credit spreads are lower when investor sentiment is high and when the systematic jump risk is low. In the cross section, we confirm that firm-level cash flow volatility raises credit spreads. More importantly, we demonstrate that the impact of market conditions on credit spreads is substantially affected by firm heterogeneity. During economic expansions, ceteris paribus, firms with high cash flow betas have lower credit spreads than those with low cash flow betas. This relation disappears during economic recessions, consistent with theoretical predictions. -- In diesem Arbeitspapier untersuchen wir empirisch, wie die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Bedingungen die Renditeabstände von Unternehmensanleihen, die mit einem Ausfallrisiko behaftet sind, beeinflussen. Dabei verwenden wir Spreads von Kreditausfallswaps (Credit Default Swap, CDS) als Näherungswert für Kreditspreads und stellen fest, dass die durchschnittlichen Kreditspreads im Zeitverlauf bei wirtschaftlicher Expansion niedriger und bei wirtschaftlicher Rezession höher sind. Wenn das Wirtschaftswachstum volatiler ist, führt dies ebenfalls zu höheren Kreditspreads. Wir stellen fest, dass Kreditspreads bei positiver Anlegerstimmung und geringem Risiko eines marktweiten Sprungs niedriger ausfallen. Firmenübergreifend stellen wir fest, dass ein auf Unternehmensebene volatiler Cashflow zu einer Erhöhung der Kreditspreads führt. Was noch entscheidender ist, wir zeigen, dass in Zeiten wirtschaftlicher Expansion ? bei ansonsten gleichen Bedingungen ? Unternehmen, deren Cashflow stark mit dem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wachstum korreliert, geringere Kreditspreads aufweisen als solche mit einer schwachen Cashflow-Korrelation. Im Einklang mit den theoretischen Voraussagen verschwindet dieser Zusammenhang in Zeiten wirtschaftlicher Rezession.Credit Risk,Credit Default Swaps,Credit Spreads,Market Conditions

“Does the tail wag the dog? The effect of credit default swaps on credit risk”

Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivative contracts that are widely used as tools for credit risk management. However, in recent years, concerns have been raised about whether CDS trading itself affects the credit risk of the reference entities. We use a unique, comprehensive sample covering CDS trading of 901 North American corporate issuers, between June 1997 and April 2009, to address this question. We find that the probability of both a credit rating downgrade and bankruptcy increase, with large economic magnitudes, after the inception of CDS trading. This finding is robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS trading. Beyond the CDS introduction effect, we show that firms with relatively larger amounts of CDS contracts outstanding, and those with relatively more “no restructuring” contracts than other types of CDS contracts covering restructuring, are more adversely affected by CDS trading. Moreover, the number of creditors increases after CDS trading begins, exacerbating creditor coordination failure for the resolution of financial distress

Does the Tail Wag the Dog? The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk

Concerns have been raised, especially since the global financial crisis, about whether trading in credit default swaps (CDS) increases the credit risk of the reference entities. This study examines this issue by quantifying the impact of CDS trading on the credit risk of firms. We use a unique, comprehensive sample covering 901 CDS introductions on North American corporate issuers between June 1997 and April 2009 to address this question. We present evidence that the probability of a credit downgrade and of bankruptcy both increase after the inception of CDS trading. The effect is robust to controlling for the endogeneity of CDS introduction, i.e., the possibility that firms selected for CDS trading are more likely to suffer a subsequent deterioration in creditworthiness. We show that the CDS-protected lenders’ reluctance to restructure is the most likely cause of the increase in credit risk. We present evidence that firms with relatively large amounts of CDS contracts outstanding, and those with “No Restructuring” contracts, are more likely to be adversely affected by CDS trading. We also document that CDS trading increases the level of participation of bank lenders to the firm. Our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of the “empty creditor” model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011)

Can central banks boost corporate investment? Evidence from ECB liquidity injections

Liquidity injections by central banks have become frequent and massive, but their real effects on corporate investment remain unclear. We examine the longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the euro-zone sovereign crisis and show that greater LTRO funding to banks is associated with lower corporate investment. Riskier banks received funds through the LTROs and subsequently increased their holdings of risky sovereign debt. Corporate investment reductions are associated with these banks. Further, concurrent fiscal and regulatory policies impeded the effectiveness of the ECB liquidity injections. Our findings identify the contributing factors for these failures of monetary policy

Is "greenness" priced in the market? Evidence from green bond issuance in China

Green bonds are bonds with a defined use of proceeds toward mitigating and adapting to climate change and solving environmental problems. Although the green bond market has expanded rapidly in recent years and has attracted great investment attention, whether investors can identify greenwashing behaviors remains a primary concern. This article takes advantage of the unique feature of the Chinese green bond market that allows a proportion of the proceeds to be used for nongreen purposes. The authors find that greener bonds (more proceeds are used for green projects) are sold at a premium. This pricing differential is primarily driven by bonds with proceeds used 100% for green projects. The authors also show that green bonds verified by a third party have lower yield spreads and the effect is stronger for more reputable third parties. Overall, the results suggest that investors reward only fully green bonds and that investors can discern "greenwashing.